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CONSERVATIVE STATISTICAL POST-ELECTION AUDITS
By Philip B. Stark
University of California, Berkeley
There are many sources of error in counting votes: the apparent
winner might not be the rightful winner. Hand tallies of the votes in
a random sample of precincts can be used to test the hypothesis that
a full manual recount would find a different outcome. This paper
develops a conservative sequential test based on the vote-counting
errors found in a hand tally of a simple or stratified random sam-
ple of precincts. The procedure includes a natural escalation: If the
hypothesis that the apparent outcome is incorrect is not rejected at
stage s, more precincts are audited. Eventually, either the hypothesis
is rejected—and the apparent outcome is confirmed—or all precincts
have been audited and the true outcome is known. The test uses a pri-
ori bounds on the overstatement of the margin that could result from
error in each precinct. Such bounds can be derived from the reported
counts in each precinct and upper bounds on the number of votes
cast in each precinct. The test allows errors in different precincts to
be treated differently to reflect voting technology or precinct sizes. It
is not optimal, but it is conservative: the chance of erroneously con-
firming the outcome of a contest if a full manual recount would show
a different outcome is no larger than the nominal significance level.
The approach also gives a conservative P -value for the hypothesis
that a full manual recount would find a different outcome, given the
errors found in a fixed size sample. This is illustrated with two con-
tests from November, 2006: the U.S. Senate race in Minnesota and
a school board race for the Sausalito Marin City School District in
California, a small contest in which voters could vote for up to three
candidates.
1. Introduction. Votes can be miscounted because of human error (by
voters or election workers), hardware or software “bugs” or deliberate fraud.
Post-election audits—manual tallies of votes in individual precincts—are in-
tended to detect miscount, especially miscount large enough to alter the out-
come of the election.1 To the best of my knowledge, eighteen states require or
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1Post-election audits can also reveal process problems, programming errors, equipment
malfunctions and other issues that should be addressed even if they do not change the
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allow post-election audits [National Association of Secretaries of State (2007)
and Verified Voting Foundation (2007)]. California is one. Since 1965, Cali-
fornia Elections Code has required a hand count of the ballots in a random
sample of 1% of the precincts in each county, plus one precinct for each
contest not represented in the 1% sample.2 A post-election audit of 1% of
precincts is a reasonable check for gross error and malfunction. However,
to provide high confidence3 that a full manual recount would confirm the
apparent outcome requires auditing a number of precincts that depends on
the number of precincts in the contest, the number of ballots cast in each
precinct, the apparent margin of victory and the discrepancies the audit
finds. No flat percentage, short of 100%, gives high confidence in all circum-
stances.4
In August 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen de-certified
and conditionally re-certified electronic voting machines in California. One
condition of re-certification is that elections be audited using a sample size
that depends on “the apparent margin of victory, the number of precincts,
the number of ballots cast in each precinct, and a desired confidence level
that the winner of the election has been called correctly.”5 The method
outcome. And audits deter fraud. See Norden et al. (2007) and Jefferson et al. (2007). For
more on election monitoring, see Bjornlund (2004). An alternative approach to detecting
error and deterring fraud is the “quick count,” which monitors the counting process at
a random set of polling stations or precincts. See Estok, Nevitte and Cowan (2002). An
advantage of quick counts is that they can monitor the process, not just the outcome. A
disadvantage is that poll workers and potential fraudsters can know which precincts or
polling places are being monitored before the counts are official. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office has published many reports on the accuracy and reliability of voting
systems and election outcomes [e.g., Elections: Federal efforts to improve security and reli-
ability of electronic voting systems are under way, but key activities need to be completed
(2005), Elections: The nation’s evolving election system as reflected in the November 2004
general election (2006) and Hite (2007)].
2See, for example, California Elections Code §15360.
3The meaning of “confidence” in the election audit community differs from its meaning
in statistics. The “confidence” that the apparent outcome is correct is 100% minus the P -
value of the hypothesis that the apparent outcome differs from the outcome a full manual
recount would find.
4Some audit laws, such as California’s 1% law, use the same precinct sampling frac-
tion for every contest in an election. The amount of error required to make the apparent
outcome of a contest wrong depends on the margin in the contest. The probability distri-
bution of the miscount an audit uncovers in a contest depends on how the sample is drawn
and the sample size, and also on the number of precincts in the contest and the number
of ballots and miscounted ballots in each contest in each precinct. And the amount of
error required to produce to make one of the losing candidates appear to be the winner
depends on the margin in the contest. Thus, the decision of whether to confirm an election
outcome depends on variables that are specific to a single contest. The method developed
here addresses one contest at a time.
5See www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections vsr.htm.
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presented here solves that problem. I am not aware of any other method that
does. New Jersey recently passed a bill that requires post-election audits of
randomly selected precincts, “to ensure with at least 99% statistical power
that for each federal, gubernatorial or other Statewide election held in the
State, a 100% manual recount of the voter-verifiable paper records would not
alter the electoral outcome reported by the audit. For each election held for
State office, other than Governor and Lieutenant Governor, and for county
and municipal elections held in 100 or more election districts (the procedure
will) ensure with at least 90% statistical power that a 100% manual recount
of the voter-verifiable paper records would not alter the electoral outcome
reported by the audit.”6 Again, the method presented here is the only one
I am aware of that meets this requirement.
The U.S. House of Representatives is considering a bill, H.R. 811, The
Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (Holt),7 which
requires post-election audits of federal elections. The sampling percentage
depends on the apparent margin of victory. Because the sampling percentage
does not take into account precinct sizes, the number of precincts in a contest
or the errors uncovered during the audit, it does not guarantee any particular
level of confidence that the apparent outcome agrees with the outcome a full
manual recount would find.
The Massachusetts legislature is also considering a bill that would require
post-election audits of 5% of precincts, H671. The bill demands a complete
recount if the discrepancy between the manual count and the reported vote
exceeds certain thresholds. Like H.R. 811, H671 requires sampling a per-
centage of precincts that does not depend on the number of precincts in the
contest, so it does not guarantee any particular level of confidence that the
correct candidate was named the winner—unless a full recount is triggered.
Minnesota has an audit law (SF 2743) that requires audits of elections for
President, governor, U.S. Senator and U.S. Representative. The sample size
in each county is related to the number of registered voters in the county,
rather than the number of precincts in the county. The sampling percentage
the law requires does not take into account the number of precincts in the
contest or the margin, but it has provisions for increasing the sample size
if discrepancies are found; large discrepancies can trigger a recount of a
county or an entire congressional district. Like the bills mentioned above,
the Minnesota audit law does not guarantee any particular level of confidence
that the outcome of the election is correct. See also Section 5.2.
Previous papers on the statistics of post-election audits [e.g., Saltman
(1975), McCarthy et al. (2008), Dopp and Stenger (2006) and Rivest (2006)]
6www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/AL07/349 .PDF.
7See holt.house.gov/HR 811.shtml.
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in essence have concentrated on the question, “if there is enough error overall
to change the outcome of an election, how large a random sample of precincts
must be drawn to have chance at least 1−α of finding at least one error?”8
If fewer precincts than that are audited, we will not have 1− α confidence
that the outcome of the election is correct, even if the audit finds no errors.
That is because there are ways of distributing enough miscount to spoil the
election that have chance greater than α of being missed entirely by the
sample.
If the sample is at least as large as these methods prescribe, and the
manual tally finds no error, we are done: either the apparent winner is the
true winner or an event with probability less than α occurred (or one of
the assumptions of the method is wrong). But if the sample contains any
miscount, however small, these approaches do not tell us how reliable the
election outcome is, nor whether to confirm the outcome. The rules are
incomplete.
Manual tallies routinely turn up small miscounts. What should we do
then? Recount the entire contest by hand? Audit more precincts? If so, how
many? What if the expanded audit finds more miscount? When do we stop?
How do we decide whether the outcome is in doubt?
An audit procedure is incomplete unless it always either (i) confirms the
outcome of the election or (ii) demands a full recount. And it should have
an error rate that can be quantified in a reasonable way. For example, a
procedure might come with a mathematical guarantee that if it confirms
the outcome of the election, either the outcome is the same that a full
manual recount would find, or an event with probability no greater than α
occurred.9
Deciding whether to confirm the outcome of a contest can be viewed as
testing a null hypothesis. The null hypothesis for election audits can be
chosen in more than one way. For example, the null hypothesis could be
“the outcome is right” or “the outcome is wrong.” In the Neyman/Pearson
paradigm, the chance of a type I error, the error of rejecting the null hypoth-
esis when it is true, is controlled to be at most α, the significance level.10 The
risk of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true is primary.
8The computations in those papers assume that the precincts to be hand-tallied are a
random sample without replacement drawn from all the precincts in the contest. However,
in California, the precincts for audit are not chosen that way. Rather, 1% of the precincts
in each county are chosen at random (additional precincts are chosen, not necessarily
at random, if contests are missed by the sample). This is a stratified random sample of
precincts, not a simple random sample of precincts.
9See Section 6.5 for other possibilities.
10One can try to find the level-α test that maximizes the power, the chance of rejecting
the null hypothesis when a particular alternative is true.
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In election auditing, the primary risk is that of confirming an outcome
that is wrong. Failing to confirm an outcome that is correct—on the basis of
an initial audit sample—could lead to additional auditing, but that economic
risk seems less serious than the risk of awarding the contest to the wrong
candidate. We want the audit to provide strong evidence that the contest
came out right, not just to fail to find evidence that the contest came out
wrong. Hence, it makes sense to choose the null hypothesis to be that the
outcome is wrong, and to devise a test that has probability at most α of
incorrectly rejecting that hypothesis. If we reject the hypothesis that the
outcome is wrong, we conclude that the apparent outcome is the outcome
a full manual recount would find. If not, we count more votes. Eventually,
either we confirm the outcome or we have recounted all the ballots by hand.
This paper constructs a conservative sequential test of the hypothesis that
the apparent outcome is not the outcome a full manual recount would find.
The test terminates either with the declaration that the apparent outcome
is correct or with a full recount. The chance is at most α that the procedure
declares that the outcome is correct if the outcome is not the outcome a
full manual recount would find. The procedure also gives a P -value for the
hypothesis that the outcome is incorrect: a number P such that, given the
errors observed in the sample, either a full manual recount would find the
same outcome or an event that had probability no greater than P occurred.
In the approach developed here, an audit can confirm the outcome of
a contest, but only a full manual recount can invalidate the outcome. So,
there is a positive probability that a declaration that the election outcome
is correct is mistaken, but a declaration that the outcome is incorrect is as
certain as a full manual recount can be. The approach automatically leads
to a full recount if the outcome of the contest is not validated by a manual
tally of some sufficiently large random sample of precincts.
There are many ad hoc choices in the method below, and the approach is
not the most powerful [with a different method, it might be possible to get
the same confidence by auditing fewer precincts. See, e.g., Stark (2008b).]
The choices were made to simplify the exposition and implementation: meth-
ods need to be transparent to be adopted as part of the election process and
to inspire public confidence. For example, an approach that required numer-
ical optimization to maximize P -values for a likelihood ratio test statistic
over sets of nuisance parameters might be more efficient, but because of
its complexity would likely meet resistance from elections officials and vot-
ing rights groups. In contrast, the most esoteric calculation required for the
method presented here is
(N
n
)
. It could be implemented in a spreadsheet
program, which is perhaps a good design criterion for software to be used
by jurisdictional users at all levels of government.
The main point of this paper is not the method itself; rather, the method
is an existence proof showing that it is possible to get conservative statistical
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Table 1
Notation
C number of counties with at least one precinct in the contest.
C the integers {1, . . . ,C}.
N ≡
∑
c∈C
Nc number of precincts in the contest.
N the integers {1, . . . ,N}.
Nc number of precincts in the contest in county c.
J ⋆n a simple random sample of n elements of N .
J ⋄n a random sample with replacement of n elements of N .
bp reported voting opportunities in precinct p, f times the num-
ber of ballots reported in precinct p, including undervoted
and invalid ballots.
Bc reported voting opportunities in county c.
B ≡
∑
p∈N
bp =
∑
c∈C
Bc reported voting opportunities in the contest.
K number of candidates and pseudo-candidates in the contest,
after pooling. See Section 3.1.
K the integers {1, . . . ,K}.
Kw the indices of the f candidates who are apparent winners.
Kℓ the indices of the K− f candidates who are apparent losers.
akp actual vote for (pseudo-)candidate k in precinct p.
Ak ≡
∑
p∈N
akp actual total vote for (pseudo-)candidate k.
rp upper bound on
∑
k∈K
akp, the actual total vote in precinct
p.
vkp reported vote for (pseudo-)candidate k in precinct p.
Vk ≡
∑
p∈N
vkp total vote reported for (pseudo-)candidate k.
M overall apparent margin in votes: reported votes for the ap-
parent winner(s) with fewest reported votes, minus reported
votes for an the apparent loser(s) with the most reported
votes: M =
∧
k∈Kw
Vk −
∨
k∈Kℓ
Vk.
ep ≡
∑
k∈Kw
(v1p − a1p)+ maximum by which error in precinct p could increase M .
+
∑
k∈Kℓ
(akp − vkp)+
up a priori upper bound on ep. See Section 3.2.
E =
∑
p∈N
ep maximum by which error in all precincts could increase M .
wp(·) a monotonic weight function for error in precinct p. See Sec-
tion 3.3.
w−1p (·) the inverse of wp: w
−1
p (t)≡ supz{z :wp(z)≤ t}.
measures of confidence in election outcomes from post-election audit results
using simple computations.
2. Assumptions and notation. Table 1 sets out the notation. All variables
refer to a single contest of the form “vote for up to f candidates.” Each ballot
has f voting opportunities for the contest; there are f apparent winners of
the contest. A ballot with votes for more than f candidates is overvoted.
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Overvotes are invalid—they do not count as votes for any candidate.11 A
ballot with votes for fewer than f candidates is undervoted. The number of
undervotes on such a ballot is f minus the number of votes.
The analysis uses the following assumptions:
1. All kinds of error are possible in the machine counts: there can be errors
in the number of valid votes for each candidate, undervotes and invalid
votes. Ballots can be overlooked entirely. Ballots that do not exist can be
counted.
2. The truth is whatever the hand tally shows. (When the hand count does
not match the machine count, the hand count is typically repeated until
the counters are confident that the problem is with the machine count.
Hand counts are subject to error, but they are the gold standard.)
3. Precincts are selected at random for post-election audit.
Among the apparent losers, any candidate with at least as many reported
votes as the rest is an “apparent runner-up.” The apparent margin M is the
difference between the number of votes reported for the apparent winner(s)
with the fewest reported votes and the number of votes reported for an ap-
parent runner-up. If more than f candidates have at least as many reported
votes as the apparent top f candidates, M = 0: the contest is apparently
tied for the last winning place.
More precisely, let Vk be the total number of votes reported for candidate
k, k = 1, . . . ,K. Let (V(k))
K
k=1 be the votes (Vk)
K
k=1 in rank order, so that
V(1) ≥ V(2) ≥ · · · ≥ V(K). Then M = V(f) − V(f+1). If #{k :Vk ≥ V(f)} > f ,
M = 0 and the contest is a tie.
As discussed in Section 3.1, some subsets of apparent losers (and un-
dervotes and invalid ballots) can be pooled to form a smaller number of
“pseudo-candidates.” Pooling can reduce the sample size needed to con-
firm the election. After pooling, there remain K candidates and pseudo-
candidates, numbered 1 through K.
3. Testing the election outcome. The approach to testing whether the
apparent election outcome is wrong is as follows:
1. Select a test statistic.12
11Some states have “voter intent” laws: the people conducting the hand tally try to
determine what the voter intended, even if a machine could not. So, for example, a ballot
that had a mark for George Washington and also had George Washington as a write-in
candidate would be an overvote according to the machine, but a human might infer that
the voter intended to vote for George Washington. This paper assumes that rules are in
place for determining whether that is a valid vote.
12In principle, the choice could be optimized to maximize power against some alter-
natives. In practice, the method must be transparent, easy for the public to understand,
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2. Select a sampling design and an increasing sequence of sample sizes
(ns).
13 Select a corresponding sequence of significance levels (αs) that
give a level-α test overall.14
3. Set s= 1. Set the initial sample to be the empty set.
4. Augment the current sample by a random sample so that it contains ns
precincts in all.
5. Tally the votes in the new precincts by hand.
6. Calculate the test statistic and the maximum P -value for the test statistic
over all ways of allocating error among the precincts that would result in
a different election outcome.
7. If the maximum P -value is less than αs, confirm the apparent outcome.
Otherwise, increment s and return to step 4, unless all N precincts have
now been hand tallied. If all precincts have been hand tallied, confirm
the outcome the hand tally shows.
3.1. Marginal notes.
Example 1. Consider a winner-take-all (f = 1) contest with K = 2 can-
didates. The reported vote for the apparent winner is V1 = 1,000 votes, and
the reported vote for the apparent loser is V2 = 500 votes. The margin is
M = 1,000− 500 = 500 votes.
It is possible that both candidates actually had 750 votes and the apparent
margin was produced by miscounting 250 ballots with votes for the apparent
loser as votes for the apparent winner: if the apparent winner’s vote total
was high by 250 and the apparent loser’s vote total was low by 250, that
could have turned a tie into the apparent margin. Alternatively, if 500 ap-
parent undervotes were miscounted as votes for the apparent winner, that
could have turned a tie into the apparent margin. Or if 500 ballots with
votes for the apparent loser had been overlooked on election day, that could
have turned a tie into the apparent margin. Or if 500 ballots with votes for
the apparent winner had been double-counted on election day, that could
easy for elections officials to implement, and easy to verify or replicate. Here I use the
maximum of functions of the amount by which error in each precinct in the sample could
have inflated the margin, after pooling subsets of losers as described in Section 3.1. This
leads to simple probability calculations. See Section 3.3.
13We might increase the sample size by a fixed number of precincts at each stage, such
as ⌈0.02N⌉. Or we might increment the sample by the smallest number of precincts such
that, if the test statistic did not increase from its current value, we would confirm the
outcome. The only requirement is that ns+1 − ns ≥ 1.
14For example, αs ≡ α/2
s, s= 1, . . . . Alternatively, if the sequence of sample sizes (ns)
guarantees that by stage S all N precincts will be in the sample, we could take αs = α/S.
These choices just use Bonferroni’s inequality; one could do better using methods from
sequential analysis. See Section 6.4.
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have turned a tie into the apparent margin. If 100 votes for the apparent
loser had been miscounted as undervotes, 100 had been miscounted as votes
for the apparent winner, 100 votes for the apparent loser had been over-
looked entirely, and 100 nonexistent ballots had been counted as votes for
the apparent winner, that could have turned a tie into the apparent margin.
(Net, the reported vote totals would have been off by 200 for the apparent
winner and 300 for the apparent loser, 500 votes in all.) But if the overcount
for the apparent winner plus the undercount for the apparent loser is less
than 500 votes in all, the apparent winner must be the true winner.
More generally, suppose there are K candidates in all, undervotes, invalid
ballots and overlooked ballots. (A negative number of ballots could be over-
looked, corresponding to overcounting real ballots or counting nonexistent
ballots.) An error that increases the count for any of the apparent winners
by 1 vote increases the apparent margin by at most 1 vote. An error that
decreases the count for any of the apparent losers by 1 vote increases the
apparent margin by at most 1 vote. Conversely, errors that decrease the
count for any apparent winner or that increase the count for any apparent
loser might decrease the apparent margin, but cannot increase the apparent
margin. Miscounting a vote for an apparent loser as a vote for an apparent
winner could affect inflate the apparent margin by as much as 2 votes (or
possibly 0 or 1). Miscounting an undervote as a vote for one of the apparent
winners could increase the apparent margin by as much as 1 vote. Overlook-
ing a valid vote for one of the losers could increase the apparent margin by
as much as 1 vote. Errors in the number of undervotes or invalid ballots do
not by themselves affect the margin.
In summary, the amount by which error could have artificially inflated the
apparent margin is at most the total overcount for all the apparent winners,
plus the total undercount for all the apparent losers.
Let vkp be the reported number of votes for candidate k in precinct p,
Vk =
∑
p∈N vkp be the total number of reported votes for candidate k, akp be
the actual number of votes for candidate k in precinct p, and Ak =
∑
p∈N akp
be the actual total number of votes for candidate k. Let Kw denote the
indices of the candidates who are apparent overall winners of the race (so
#Kw = f ) and let Kℓ denote the indices of the candidates who are apparent
losers. For real z, define z+ ≡ z ∨ 0. The potential margin overstatement in
precinct p is
ep ≡
∑
k∈Kw
(vkp − akp)+ +
∑
k∈Kℓ
(akp − vkp)+.(1)
The total potential margin overstatement is E ≡
∑
p∈N ep. The net potential
margin overstatement in the election is
E ≡
∑
k∈Kw
(Vk −Ak)+ +
∑
k∈Kℓ
(Ak − Vk)+.(2)
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We know that
M =
∧
k∈Kw
Vk −
∨
k∈Kℓ
Vk.(3)
Thus,
∧
k∈Kw
Ak −
∨
k∈Kℓ
Ak ≥
( ∧
k∈Kw
Vk −
∨
k∈Kw
(Vk −Ak)+
)
−
( ∨
k∈Kℓ
Vk +
∨
k∈Kℓ
(Ak − Vk)+
)
≥
( ∧
k∈Kw
Vk −
∑
k∈Kw
(Vk −Ak)+
)
(4)
−
( ∨
k∈Kℓ
Vk +
∑
k∈Kℓ
(Ak − Vk)+
)
=M −
∑
k∈Kw
(Vk −Ak)+ −
∑
k∈Kℓ
(Ak − Vk)+
=M − E .
So, the apparent set of winners must be the true set of winners if
E <M.(5)
By the triangle inequality,
E ≡
∑
k∈Kw
(Vk −Ak)+ +
∑
k∈Kℓ
(Ak − Vk)+
=
∑
k∈Kw
(∑
p∈N
(vkp − akp)
)
+
+
∑
k∈Kℓ
(∑
p∈N
(akp − vkp)
)
+
≤
∑
k∈Kw
∑
p∈N
(vkp − akp)+ +
∑
k∈Kℓ
∑
p∈N
(akp − vkp)+(6)
=
∑
p∈N
( ∑
k∈Kw
(vkp − akp)+ +
∑
k∈Kℓ
(akp − vkp)+
)
=
∑
p∈N
ep ≡E.
Hence, the apparent outcome must be the same that a full manual recount
would show if E <M . Our test is based on this condition. For a sharper
sufficient condition, see Stark (2008b).
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Example 2. Consider a winner-take-all (f = 1) contest with K = 4 can-
didates. The reported vote totals are V1 = 800 votes, V2 = 500 votes, V3 = 150
votes, and V4 = 50 votes. The margin is M = 800− 500 = 300 votes. The re-
ported winner might not be the real winner if 150 votes for candidate 2 had
been miscounted as votes for candidate 1, producing a net potential margin
overstatement in the election of 300 votes; then candidates 1 and 2 might
have been tied. Candidate 3 could not have been the winner unless the net
potential margin overstatement in the election is more than 650 votes, and
candidate 4 could not have been the winner unless the net potential margin
overstatement in the election is more than 750 votes. The apparent winner
must be the true winner if E <M .
Example 3. What if, in Example 2, we pretend that candidates 3
and 4 are a single “pseudo-candidate” with 150 + 50 = 200 reported votes?
Then K = 3 (pseudo-)candidates, with V1 = 800 votes, V2 = 500 votes, and
V3 = 200 votes. Candidate 1 must be the true winner if the net potential mar-
gin overstatement in the election for candidate 1, candidate 2 and pseudo-
candidate 3 is less thanM = 300 votes. If pseudo-candidate 3 could not have
been the winner, then neither the original candidate 3 nor the original candi-
date 4 could have been the winner, because the pseudo-candidate gets all the
votes for both of them—at least as many votes as either gets separately. The
apparent winner must be the true winner if E <M , with E measured for
the three pseudo-candidates who remain after pooling candidates 3 and 4.
Pooling candidates 3 and 4 into a single pseudo-candidate tends to result
in a more powerful test, because ep, the potential margin overstatement in
precinct p, then ignores errors that do not change the number of votes for
the pseudo-candidate, such as counting a vote for candidate 3 as a vote for
candidate 4 or vice versa. Such errors cannot suffice to change the outcome
of the election. For the outcome to be wrong, in addition to errors that redis-
tribute votes among the candidates who are pooled together, it is necessary
that E ≥M .
If we pool candidates 2 and 3 into a single pseudo-candidate with 500 +
150 = 650 votes, the margin between the apparent winner and that pseudo-
candidate is only 150 votes. Provided the total potential margin overstate-
ment measured for candidate 1, the pseudo-candidate and candidate 4 is less
than 150 votes, candidate 1 must be the real winner. The sufficient condition
for the outcome to be right has changed: we need E < 150<M . In effect, we
need to test using a smaller margin, the margin between the winner and the
pseudo-candidate—the runner-up after pooling. That could result in a less
powerful test, so we will avoid it. We cannot pool candidates whose total
vote is greater than or equal to the vote for any of the apparent winners,
because then the outcome of the contest could be wrong even if E = 0.
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Example 4. Suppose that the contest allows votes for up to two out of
three candidates, so f = 2 andK = 3. Suppose that a full hand recount would
show that candidate 1 got 1,000 votes, candidate 2 got 500 votes, candidate 3
got 500 votes, there were 250 undervotes and there were 250 overvoted
ballots. Let M ≤ 500. Miscounting M/2 of the votes for candidate 3 as votes
for candidate 2 would produce an apparent margin ofM between them, with
net potential margin overstatement in the election of M . Miscounting M of
the overvoted ballots as one vote each for candidate 1 and candidate 2 would
produce an apparent margin of M votes between candidates 2 and 3, with
net potential margin overstatement in the election of 2M . Failing to count
M of the votes cast for candidate 3 would produce an apparent margin of M
votes between candidates 2 and 3, with a net potential margin overstatement
in the election of M . The outcome must be correct if E <M .
Example 5. Finally, consider an example with f = 2, undervotes and
overvotes and pooling. There are four candidates on the ballot, plus two
write-in candidates. The reported votes are as follows: 500 votes for the
apparent overall winner; 400 votes for the apparent second-place winner;
300 votes for the apparent runner-up (the loser with the most votes); 100 votes
for the apparent fourth-place candidate listed on the ballot; 5 votes for each
of the two write-ins; 50 undervotes and 50 invalid ballots. The margin is
M = 400−300 = 100 votes. If we pool the fourth-place candidate, the write-
ins, the undervotes and f times the overvotes into a single pseudo-candidate,
that pseudo-candidate would have 100+5+5+50+2×50 = 260 votes, fewer
than the runner-up. So, we can take K = 4 candidates, corresponding to the
apparent overall winner, the apparent second winner, the runner-up and the
pseudo-candidate. The outcome of the election cannot be wrong unless the
net potential margin overstatement in the election, measured for those four
(pseudo-)candidates, is at least M = 100 votes. The total potential margin
overstatement E would have to be greater than 140 votes for the pseudo-
candidate to be one of the winners, and if the pseudo-candidate is not a
winner, neither the apparent fourth-place candidate nor any of the write-ins
could be winners. Hence, the outcome must be correct if E <M .
We shall adopt the following rule for pooling:
Pooling rule. Pool the losers into groups so that no group has more
votes than the runner-up, but the group with the fewest votes has as many
votes as possible.
Other pooling rules make sense too, for example, “pool the losers into as
few groups as possible such that no group has more votes than the runner-
up.” Any such pooling rule ignores many errors that by themselves cannot
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affect the outcome of the contest, but still the apparent winners must be
the true winners if the total potential margin overstatement E <M . If a
pseudo-candidate cannot be the winner, then neither can any of the real
candidates who were pooled to form the pseudo-candidate. The value of K is
the number of candidates and pseudo-candidates that remain after pooling.
It is not necessary to pool—the test developed below is conservative even
without pooling—but pooling yields a more powerful test. However, compare
with Stark (2008b).
3.2. Bounding the potential margin overstatement in each precinct. If
the potential margin overstatement in individual precincts can be large com-
pared to the margin, it will take a large sample to provide compelling evi-
dence that E <M , because an outcome-changing error could hide in a small
number of precincts. Miscount that could affect the outcome of an election
is easier to detect if it must be spread over many precincts.
By how much can error in precinct p inflate the apparent margin? We need
an upper bound up for the potential margin overstatement ep in precinct p.
The smaller the values u= (up)
N
p=1 are, the larger the number of precincts
that must be “tainted” to have E >M , and so the easier it is to detect an
election-altering amount of error. If any number of ballots could be over-
looked or overcounted on election day, there is no finite bound up for ep.
Some studies assume that if the discrepancy in any precinct exceeds, say,
40% of the votes reported in precinct p [Saltman (1975) and McCarthy et al.
(2008)] or 40% of the ballots reported in precinct p, including undervotes
and invalid ballots [Dopp and Stenger (2006)], that would be detected even
without an audit. (If votes on 20% of the ballots had been “flipped” to an
apparent winner from an apparent loser, that would produce a potential
margin overstatement ep of 40% of the ballots.) That is, the studies take
up = 0.4bp. This could be reasonable in some circumstances, but it is hard
to justify.
Suppose we know a number rp ≥ 0 so that the actual total vote satisfies∑
k∈K akp ≤ rp. For example, in precincts that use optical scan ballots, the
total number of votes can be no larger than f times the number of ballots
delivered to the precinct, so that could serve as rp. The number of votes cast
in a precinct can be no larger than f times the number of voters registered in
a precinct, including same-day registrations (if the jurisdiction allows them),
so that could serve as rp. A count of signatures in a precinct pollbook, times
f , might provide a value for rp, although occasionally someone might vote
without signing in. In some jurisdictions, elections officials check the number
of voted, spoiled and unvoted ballots in every precinct against the number of
ballots sent to and returned from the precinct. The number of voted ballots
according to such an “accounting of ballots,” times f , could serve as rp.
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If
∑
k∈K akp ≤ rp, it is impossible for ep to exceed
e+p (rp)≡ max
x∈RK : x≥0,
∑
k∈K
xk≤rp
{ ∑
k∈Kw
(vkp − xk)+ +
∑
k∈Kℓ
(xk − vkp)+
}
(7)
= rp +
∑
k∈Kw
vkp −
∧
k∈Kℓ
vkp.
These bounds suppose that every one of the rp possible valid votes in precinct
p might in fact have been a vote for the apparent loser k ∈Kℓ with the fewest
reported votes in precinct p. Let e+(r) denote the N -vector with components
(e+(r))p = e
+
p (rp), p ∈N .
Note that if some apparent loser k ∈Kℓ gets no votes in precinct p, e
+
p (rp)
takes its maximum possible value, rp +
∑
k∈Kw vkp; e
+
p (rp) gets smaller as
the minimum number of votes any apparent loser gets in precinct p gets
bigger. The pooling rule in Section 3.1 tends to make
∧
k∈Kℓ
vkp larger than
it would be without pooling. This is another way pooling helps, especially
in contests with write-in candidates, because often there are many precincts
in which some write-in candidate receives no votes.
Henceforth, u will be a vector of upper bounds for e. Whether u is e+(r),
0.4b or some other bound does not matter for the rest of the mathematical
development.
3.3. The test statistic. For any x ∈RN and J ⊂N , define∨
J
x≡
∨
p∈J
xp(8)
and ∑
J
x≡
∑
p∈J
xp.(9)
For x, y ∈RN , define x∧ y to be the vector with components
(x∧ y)p = xp ∧ yp, p ∈N ,(10)
and x∨ y to be the vector with components
(x∨ y)p = xp ∨ yp, p ∈N .(11)
Fix a set of monotonically increasing functions w = (wp(·))Np=1 and for
x ∈ RN , define w(x) ≡ (wp(xp))
N
p=1. Let J
⋆
n be a simple random sample of
size n from N . The hypothesis test is based on the test statistic∨
J ⋆n
w(e).(12)
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The functions w = (wp(·)) quantify our relative tolerance for errors in dif-
ferent precincts p ∈N . All choices of w yield conservative tests, so w can be
chosen at will. For example, we might choose wp(z) = z. Then every error
that could increase the apparent margin gets the same weight. Or we might
choose wp(z) = z/bp; then
∨
J ⋆n
w(e) is the maximum potential margin over-
statement relative to the reported number of voting opportunities in the
precinct. We might choose wp(z) = z/up; then
∨
J ⋆n
w(e) is the maximum
potential overstatement of the margin as a fraction of the bound on the
margin overstatement in the precinct. Or we might pick wp(z) to reflect the
accuracy of the voting technology. For example, we might be less tolerant
of error in precincts with direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines than
we are of error in precincts with optically scanned ballots.15 Then we might
pick wp(·) to grow more rapidly for DRE precincts than for precincts that
use optically scanned ballots. Because post-election audits often find a mis-
counted vote or two, even in precincts with very few votes, weight functions
of the following form can be desirable:
wp(z) = (z −m)+/bp,(13)
with m on the order of 2 or 3. This function ignores potential margin over-
statements of up to m votes per precinct, and penalizes larger potential
margin overstatements in inverse proportion to the size of the precinct (here
size is the reported number of voting opportunities). That prevents an error
in scanning a single ballot in a small precinct from making the test statistic
large, but takes into account the fact that we expect more discrepancies in
larger precincts, all other things being equal.
3.4. Tail probabilities for the sample maximum. This section shows how
to find P -values for the hypothesis E ≥M using the test statistic
∨
J ⋆n
w(e).
We have a vector u= (up)
N
p=1 > 0 of upper bounds on the errors (ep)
N
p=1
and a vector of monotonically increasing functions w= (wp)
N
p=1. If the total
potential margin overstatement E =
∑
N e is big, if e≤ u, and if the sample
is big enough, it is unlikely that
∨
J ⋆n
w(e) will be small. So, if the observed
value of
∨
J ⋆n
w(e) is “small enough,” that is evidence that E =
∑
N e <M—
evidence that a full recount would find the same outcome. This section makes
the idea precise.
15If a DRE is working correctly, it should record every vote perfectly. In contrast, if
a voter does not use an appropriate pen or pencil to fill in an optically scanned ballot,
makes a stray mark on the ballot or does not fill in the bubble perfectly, or if the scanner
is miscalibrated, the optical scan could reasonably differ from a human’s inference about
the voter’s intent [Jefferson et al. (2007)].
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Let t ∈R. Let the sample size n <N be fixed. Define
X =X (u,M)≡
{
x∈RN :x≤ u and
∑
N
x≥M
}
.(14)
The set X contains all ways of distributing potential margin overstatements
across precincts that satisfy the a priori bound e≤ u and the null hypothesis
E ≥M . To reject the hypothesis E =
∑
N e ≥M when we observe that∨
J ⋆n
w(e) = t, we need to know that P{
∨
J ⋆n
w(x)≤ t} is small for all x ∈ X .
Hence, we seek
pi⋆(t) = pi⋆(t;n,u,w,M)≡ max
x∈X (u,M)
Px
{∨
J ⋆n
w(x)≤ t
}
.(15)
The related quantity
pi⋄(t) = pi⋄(t;n,u,w,M)≡ max
x∈X (u,M)
Px
{∨
J ⋄n
w(x)≤ t
}
,(16)
where J ⋄n is a random sample of size n with replacement from N , is useful
to bound the P -value when the data come from a stratified sample.
The individual components of e are nuisance parameters: the null hy-
pothesis involves only their sum, E =
∑
N e, but the precinct-level potential
margin overstatements {ep} affect the probability distribution of
∨
J ⋆n
w(e),
the test statistic.
Claim 1. Let w−1(t)≡ (w−1p (t))
N
p=1. Let J
−
k be the set of indices of the
k smallest components of u − w−1(t). Let q = q(t, u,w,M) be the largest
integer for which ∑
J−q
u∧w−1(t) +
∑
N\J−q
u≥M(17)
or q = 0 if there is no such integer. Then
pi⋆(t;n,u,w,M) =


0, q < n,(q
n
)
(N
n
) , q ≥ n,(18)
and
pi⋄(t;n,u,w,M) = (q/N)
n.(19)
Claim 1 is proved in Appendix A.1.
The following algorithm finds q iteratively:
1. Set J =N .
2. If J =∅ or
∑
J u∧w
−1(t) +
∑
N\J u≥M , q =#J .
3. Otherwise, let p ∈ J attain [up − (up ∧w
−1
p (t))] =
∨
J [u− (u ∧w
−1(t))].
(Ties can be broken arbitrarily.) Remove p from J and return to step 2.
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4. Putting it together.
4.1. Testing using a simple random sample of precincts. Suppose that
the precincts for audit will be drawn as a simple random sample. To use the
present method, do the following:
1. Select an overall significance level α and a sequence (αs) so that sequential
tests at significance levels α1, α2, . . . , give an overall significance level no
larger than α. For example, we might take αs ≡ α/2
s, s= 1,2, . . . .
2. Group apparent losing candidates using the pooling rule in Section 3.1.
3. Set the error bounds u= e+.
4. Select a vector of monotonically increasing functions w = (wp(·))
N
p=1. For
example, wp(z) = z, wp(z) = z/bp or wp(z) = (z − 2)+/bp.
5. Compute the apparent margin M .
6. Select an initial sample size n1 and a rule for selecting ns when the
hypothesis E ≥M is not rejected at stage s− 1.16 The only requirement
is that n1 ≥ 0 and ns − ns−1 ≥ 1.
7. Set s= 1, n0 = 0 and J0 =∅.
8. Draw a random sample J ⋆ns−ns−1 of size ns − ns−1 from N \ Js−1. Set
Js =Js−1 ∪J
⋆
ns−ns−1 . Calculate
∨
Js w(e).
9. If pi⋆(
∨
Js w(e);ns, u,w,M) ≤ αs, confirm the outcome and stop. Other-
wise, increment s.
10. If ns <N , return to step 7. Otherwise, audit any precincts not yet in
the sample. Confirm the outcome if the outcome was correct.
If there is not a clear set of f winners (if M = 0), this will always escalate
to a full manual tally.
4.2. Testing using stratified random samples of precincts. Under current
California law, each county draws its own random sample of 1% of precincts,
at a minimum, for post-election audits. (Each county audits at least one
precinct for each contest, and fractions are rounded up. Some counties vol-
untarily audit even larger samples.) Similarly, under Minnesota law, each
county draws its own random sample of 2, 3 or 4 precincts for audit, de-
pending on the number of registered voters in the county. The samples in
different counties are drawn independently. Thus, for contests that cross
county lines, the sample of precincts is a stratified random sample, not a
simple random sample. This section presents two ways to combine inde-
pendent audits of different counties conservatively. Both have merits and
shortcomings.
Suppose there are C counties with precincts in the contest. Let C ≡
{1, . . . ,C}. Let Ec be the total potential margin overstatement in county
16Section 4.3 discusses selecting n1. See footnote 12 for approaches to selecting ns.
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c ∈ C, so E =
∑
c∈CEc. Let Nc be the number of precincts in the contest in
county c ∈ C, so N =
∑
c∈CNc. Let Bc be the number of voting opportunities
in the contest in county c ∈ C, so B =
∑
c∈CBc.
4.2.1. Bounds from proportional sampling with replacement. Fix ns > 0.
Let
ncs ≡ ⌈nsNc/N⌉.(20)
(Note
∑
c∈C ncs ≡ n
′
s ≥ ns.)
Claim 2. Suppose ncs precincts are drawn at random without replace-
ment from county c, independently for all c ∈ C. If there are k precincts
among the N in the contest for which wp(ep)≤ t, the chance that none of
the precincts in any of the C samples has wp(ep) > t is at most (k/N)
ns .
This is proved in Appendix A.2.
Essentially, for finding at least one precinct with wp(ep) > t, stratified
sampling without replacement is more effective than stratified sampling with
replacement, which is at least as effective as unstratified sampling with re-
placement if the stratum sample sizes are {ncs}. So if we draw a sample of
size ncs [equation (20)] from county c, independently for each c ∈ C, pi⋄ is an
upper bound on the maximum P -value. This approach computes probabili-
ties as if the sample were drawn with replacement from the entire population
of N precincts in the contest, but allocates the sample in proportion to the
number of precincts in each county. (Fractions are rounded up, so the actual
sample size could be up to C precincts larger than the sample size ns used
in the probability calculations.)
If N is large relative to the overall margin, this method leads to a sample
size that is not much larger than required if the sample were a simple random
sample from all N precincts in the contest. Each county does a “fair share”
of the auditing—the number of precincts a county audits is proportional to
the number of precincts in the contest in that county, but for roundoff.
However, if the null hypothesis is not rejected at stage s, the sample will
need to be expanded in every county in the contest (but for roundoff). More-
over, whether such an expansion is needed depends on the audit results from
all counties in the contest, so county audit schedules are interdependent. In
contrast, the approach in the next subsection typically requires auditing
more precincts, but the audits in different counties are logistically indepen-
dent: whether the audit in a given county needs to be expanded depends on
the audit results in that county alone.
Stanislevic (2006) makes a claim that implies that the probability that
none of the precincts in the stratified sample has wp(ep) > t is at most
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( k
ns
)
/
(N
ns
)
, that is, stratification using sample sizes {ncs} can only help. If
that conjecture were true, one could calculate the maximum P -value using
pi⋆ instead of pi⋄, and the sample size would be at most C precincts larger
than that required for a simple random sample from the N precincts in the
contest. The conjecture is false, but seems to be “almost true.”17
Note that this approach can be used to find a conservative P -value for any
set of sample sizes ncs by pretending that the overall sample size corresponds
to the smallest sampling fraction ncs/Nc; that is, that the data came from
a sample of size ns = ⌊N
∧
c∈C(ncs/Nc)⌋ drawn with replacement from the
population of N precincts. If the sampling fractions vary widely by county,
this can be extremely conservative. See Section 5.2 for an illustration.
4.2.2. Bounds from independent tests in every county.
Claim 3. There must be at least one county c ∈ C for which EcBc ≥
E
B .
This is proved in Appendix A.3.
Suppose we test in each county at significance level α whether Ec ≥
MBc/B. Let Rc be the event that the test in county c rejects the hypothesis
Ec ≥MBc/B. Then, if in at least one county Ec ≥MBc/B,
Pr
(⋂
c∈C
Rc
)
≤
∧
c∈C
Pr(Rc)≤ α(22)
17Stanislevic [personal communication (2007)] notes that there are counterexamples,
but his numerical experiments suggest that increasing n by one restores the inequality.
Moreover, he claims that the inequality fails only when the counties have equal size and
k and ns are divisible by C, and that when the inequality fails,(
k
n
)(
N
n
) <(
(
k/C
n/C
)
(
N/C
n/C
))C .(21)
That is, taint is hardest to detect when the counties are the same size and have the
same number of tainted precincts. Here is an example: Take N = 100, ns = 80, k = 98,
C = 2, N1 = N2 = 50, n1s = n2s = ⌈80/2⌉ = 40, k1 = k2 = 49 (i.e., one heavily tainted
precinct in each county). Then the chance a simple random sample of size 80 from the
100 precincts contains neither of the two heavily tainted precincts is
(98
80
)
(100
80
)
= 3.8%, but
the chance that a stratified random sample that draws 40 precincts from each of the
two counties without replacement contains neither of the two heavily tainted precincts
is (
(49
40
)
(50
40
)
)2 = 4%. In this case, the chance of finding a heavily tainted precinct is less for
the stratified random sample than for the simple random sample: stratification can hurt.
(If both heavily tainted precincts are in the same county, stratification helps.) If ns is
increased to 81 so that ncs = 41 precincts are drawn from each county, then stratification
helps. The situation with stratification is rather delicate.
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(the probability of an intersection of events is no greater than the smallest
of the event probabilities). Thus, if the total error E across precincts is M
or greater, the chance that we conclude at significance level α that Ec <
MBc/B in every one of the C counties is at most α overall, and typically
rather less.18
This approach can be quite conservative. When the counties all contain
many precincts in the contest and the margin is large, the overall sample size
will tend to be about C times larger than would be required if the sample
were drawn without stratification. This wastes resources.
However, the approach has some logistical advantages. The apparent mar-
gin depends on results in every county involved in the contest, so there must
be communication among counties before the audit can begin. But, unlike
the previous method, errors detected in one county do not require any other
county to increase its sample size, and the audit process does not require
cooperation or communication among counties.
4.3. “Fault-tolerant” initial sample size. The procedure can start with
any initial sample size n1 ≥ 0. However, if the initial sample size n1 is too
small, we will not be able to reject the hypothesis E ≥M on the basis of
the initial sample even if it shows no miscount whatsoever. Audit samples
often show small miscounts.
We can determine an initial sample size n1 so that we can confirm the
outcome without expanding the sample, provided the potential margin over-
statement found in the initial sample is sufficiently small. For example, sup-
pose we would like to be able to confirm the outcome as long as the test
statistic evaluated for the initial sample is no greater than t1. If we choose
n1 = argmin
n>0
{n :pi⋆(t1, n, u,w,M)< α1},(23)
then if
∨
J ⋆n1
w(e)≤ t1, we can confirm the outcome without expanding the
sample. Section 5.1 gives an example of this calculation.
If we are drawing a stratified random sample, we need to find an ini-
tial sample size n1c for each county c. For the approach to stratification in
Section 4.2.1, we can take n1c = ⌈n1Nc/N⌉, with
n1 = argmin
n>0
{n :pi⋄(t1, n, u,w,M)<α1}.(24)
18Dopp and Stenger have asserted that to audit contests that span more than one
county, one should set the sample size using the smaller of the county or state margin
[Dopp and Stenger (2006)]. To the best of my knowledge, they have not investigated the
effect that has on confidence in the outcome of the election, and gave no proof that it
results in a conservative test. This proof shows that if one uses the overall margin—scaled
by the number of ballots voted in the contest in the county in question—the result is
conservative.
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For the approach to stratification in Section 4.2.2, the calculation is more
complex. Let uc denote the vector of precinct error bounds for county c and
let wc denote the vector of precinct weight functions for county c. If the
initial sample size for county c is chosen to be
n1c = argmin
n>0
{n :pi⋆(t1, n, uc,wc, ⌊MBc/B⌋)< α1},(25)
we will not have to expand the audit in county c, provided the test statistic
for the initial sample is no greater than t1.
5. Examples. This section gives examples of calculating P -values for the
hypothesis that the apparent outcome of an election is wrong. It does not
give examples of expanding the sample size sequentially: data required for
those computations are not available.
5.1. November 2006 Sausalito Marin City school board race. The Novem-
ber 2006 school board race for the Sausalito Marin City School District in
Marin County, California involved nine precincts. Voters could vote for three
of five candidates or a write-in. Table 2 lists vote totals by precinct for each
candidate. Absentee and polling-place votes were combined.
The winning candidate with the fewest votes was Mark Trotter, with
2022 votes. The losing candidate with the most votes was George Strati-
gos, with 1936 votes. The margin between the two was 2022 − 1936 = 86
votes—an extremely narrow margin of 0.57% of the 15,000 possible votes. If
43 votes for Stratigos had been awarded erroneously to Trotter, that would
have sufficed to change a tie (1979 votes each) into a win for Trotter, with a
net potential margin overstatement in the election of 86. Any other change
to the set of winners would have required a larger potential margin over-
statement. Thus, if we can reject the hypothesis that the total potential
margin overstatement is greater than or equal to 86 votes, we can conclude
that the outcome of the election was correct.
Every unexercised opportunity to vote counts as an undervote. In this
example, a ballot can contribute up to three undervotes: the number of un-
dervotes on a ballot is 3 minus the number of candidates voted for, provided
the number voted for is no greater than three. If a voter marked the ballot
for more than three candidates, the ballot contributes overvotes.
We shall take wp(z) = z/bp, so that the test statistic is the maximum
potential margin overstatement as a fraction of the voting opportunities in
each precinct in the sample. Note that the number of votes for write-ins plus
the number of votes for Peter C. Romanowsky is less than the number of
votes for the runner-up, George T. Stratigos, but the number of undervotes
plus three times the number of invalid ballots is greater than the number
of votes for Stratigos. Therefore, write-ins can be pooled with each other
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Table 2
Vote totals by precinct for the November 2006 Sausalito Marin City School Board race.
Voters could vote for up to three candidates. The number of undervotes is three times the
number of ballots, minus the total number of votes for candidates, ignoring ballots
showing votes for more than three candidates (overvoted ballots). Column 9, “votes,” is
the total number of voting opportunities, three times the number of ballots. There were
5,000 ballots, including two overvoted ballots, one in precinct 3104 and one in precinct
3601. The post-election audit examined all the ballots in precinct 3107 and found a
discrepancy of one vote. The discrepancy was due to operator error; re-scanning the
ballots eliminated the discrepancy. [E. Ginnold, Registrar of Voters, Marin County,
California, personal communication (2007).] Data courtesy of E. Ginnold and M.
Briones
Undervotes+ 3×
Precinct overvotes Thornton Hoyt Trotter StratigosRomanowskyWrite-ins Votes
3001 780 296 309 283 271 60 5 2004
3002 920 311 287 274 291 44 3 2130
3104 699 238 244 240 225 48 4 1698
3105 765 270 262 240 228 56 3 1824
3106 668 239 267 294 209 58 5 1740
3107 732 251 260 236 214 53 3 1749
3600 582 235 233 129 186 51 6 1422
3601 367 234 178 126 170 40 7 1122
3602 610 160 155 200 142 39 5 1311
Total 6123 2234 2195 2022 1936 449 41 15,000
and with Romanowsky, but undervotes and invalid ballots are treated as a
separate candidate, as described in Section 3.1.
Table 3 gives three potential margin overstatement bounds: the a priori
bounds e+ based on pooling write-in candidates only, e+ based on pooling
write-in candidates and Romanowsky, and ⌈0.4b⌉, 40% of the votes, including
undervotes and three times the overvotes, rounded up to the next integer.
For all three bounds, any of the nine precincts could harbor enough miscount
to change the apparent outcome of the election.
Suppose we want to design an initial sample size so that, provided the
maximum potential margin overstatement in any precinct in the sample is no
more than 0.2% of the votes reported in that precinct (including undervotes
and three times the overvotes), we would reject the hypothesis that the
wrong set of winners was named at significance level 0.01 (we would confirm
the outcome at “confidence level” 99%). That corresponds to rejecting the
hypothesis when
∨
J ⋆n
w(e) ≤ 0.002. Note that 0.002 × 15,000 = 30 < 86, so
at least one precinct must have more than this background level of error
(0.2%) for the outcome of the election to be wrong.
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Table 3
Three possible bounds on the potential margin overstatement in each precinct. The bound
e+(b) is defined in equation (7). Column 2 pools the write-in candidates in computing
e+. Column 3 pools the write-in candidates and Peter C. Romanowsky in computing e+,
which leads to smaller bounds on the error; see Section 3.1. The bound ⌈0.4b⌉ is 40% of
the reported voting opportunities in the precinct, rounded up to the next integer. This is
analogous to the maximum within-precinct error bounds used by Saltman (1975),
Dopp and Stenger (2006) and McCarthy et al. (2008)
e+(b) write-ins e+(b) write-ins &
Precinct pooled Romanowsky pooled ⌈0.4b⌉
3001 2887 2827 802
3002 2999 2955 852
3104 2416 2368 680
3105 2593 2537 730
3106 2535 2477 696
3107 2493 2440 700
3600 2013 1962 569
3601 1653 1613 449
3602 1821 1782 525
Thus,
pi⋆(0.002, n, u,w,86) =
(8
n
)
(9
n
) .(26)
Enough miscount to change the outcome could lurk in a single precinct.
Suppose that just one precinct had miscount, and that the miscount was
enough to change the outcome of the election. Then even if we audited 8 of
the 9 precincts at random, there is a one-in-nine chance that we would fail
to audit that precinct. So, to have 99% confidence in the outcome of this
race if the observed potential margin overstatement were at most 0.2% of
the votes (including undervotes and overvotes) in any precinct, we would
have to audit every precinct. That is bad news, but since the margin is only
0.57% of the possible votes, it is not surprising.
In fact, one precinct was audited (precinct 3107) and it was found to con-
tain one error. We shall presume that this error favored one of the apparent
winners. The number of votes in precinct 3107 is 1749, so this corresponds
to a test statistic value
∨
J ⋆1
w(e) = 1/1749 = 0.00057. On the basis of this
audit, the maximum P -value of the hypothesis that the wrong set of three
candidates was declared the winner is
pi⋆(0.00057,1, u,w,86) =
(8
1
)
(9
1
) = 88.9%.(27)
So, even if there were enough miscount in the aggregate to cause the apparent
set of winners to differ from the true set of winners, the chance that an audit
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of one precinct would show wp(ep) ≤ 0.00057 could be as large as 88.9%,
depending on how the miscount is distributed across precincts.
Conversely, what would we have to believe about the error for these audit
data to yield a P -value of 1% or less? For a random sample of just one of the
nine precincts to have at most a 1% chance of having
∨
J ⋆1
w(e)≤ 0.00057, all
nine precincts would have to have wp(ep)> 0.00057. For an election-altering
discrepancy to require wp(ep)> 0.00057 in every precinct corresponds to a
bound u= 0.0057b. Unless we believe that a potential margin overstatement
of more than 0.0057% of the votes is either impossible or certain to be
detected without an audit, we could not possibly get 99% confidence in the
outcome of this race by auditing only one precinct.
5.2. November 2006 Minnesota U.S. Senate race. This section examines
the November 2006 Senate race in Minnesota. Minnesota has 87 counties
with a total of 4,123 precincts, of which 202 were audited after the election.
Table 4 lists the vote totals for the race. The winner was Amy Klobuchar
and the runner-up was Mark Kennedy. The statewide margin of victory was
443,196 votes for 2,217,818 voters, 20.0% of voters (not of cast votes).19
The audit of this election is discussed by Halvorson and Wolff (2007).
Minnesota elections law S.F. 2743 (2006) requires auditing a random sample
of precincts in each county, with a sample size that depends on the voting
population in the county: counties with fewer than 50,000 registered voters
must audit at least two precincts; counties with between 50,000 and 100,000
registered voters must audit at least three; and counties with more than
100,000 registered voters must audit at least four precincts. At least one
of the precincts audited in each county must have 150 or more votes cast.
Hennepin County audited eight precincts instead of the four required. (It
still had the smallest sampling fraction.) Several other counties also audited
more than the minimum required.
Table 4
Summary of 2006 U.S. Senate race in Minnesota
Undervotes Klobuchar
& invalid Fitzgerald Kennedy (Democ/Farm/ Cavlan Powers
Voters ballots (Indep) (Repub) Labor) (Green) (Constit) Write-ins
2,217,818 15,099 71,194 835,653 1,278,849 10,714 5,408 901
19Data in this section come from www.sos.state.mn.us/docs/2006 General Results.XLS,
electionresults.sos.state.mn.us/20061107/ElecRslts.asp?M=S&Races=0102 and
www.sos.state.mn.us/home/index.asp?page=544.
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Precincts audited had from 2 to 2,393 ballots cast.20 The largest value of
ep was 2; the largest value of ep/bp was 0.67%. The total observed discrep-
ancy was 62 votes, about 0.065% of ballots cast in the audited precincts,
including undervotes and invalid votes. The total observed potential margin
overstatement was 25 votes, about 0.026% of ballots.
The audit shows a different number of ballots from that reported in 13
of the audited precincts: “ballot accounting” apparently had not been done.
Ten of the differences were one ballot each. In two precincts,21 the number
of ballots was off by three. Most of the discrepancies in vote totals seem to
have been caused by jams in the optical scanner or by ballots fed through
the scanner twice. The observed discrepancies in bp are not large enough to
affect the error bounds e+ or 0.4b by much, but they show that bp is not
an inviolable upper bound on ap, and there might be larger discrepancies in
the precincts not sampled.
Under Minnesota law, auditors can interpret voter intent, even if the
ballot is not marked properly.22 In one precinct,23 three machine-unreadable
ballots originally tallied as undervotes were interpreted by the auditors as
votes for Amy Klobuchar. The precinct had only 96 voters, so a three-vote
error is a large percentage of bp—although in this case the error does not
contribute to ep because it favors Klobuchar, the winner. This illustrates
why taking wp(z) = z/bp is perhaps too sensitive to occasional errors, and
wp(z) = z or wp(z) = (z −m)+/bp might be preferable.
We will calculate P -values for the hypothesis that a full manual recount
would not find that Amy Klobuchar is the winner, under a variety of as-
sumptions. Because the Minnesota law links sample sizes to the number of
registered voters in each county rather than to the number of precincts in
each county and never requires more than 4 precincts per county, the sam-
pling fraction of precincts varies widely from county to county. The mini-
mum sampling fraction in the 2006 audit was 1.9% and the maximum was
23.8%. Two-thirds of the counties had precinct sampling fractions between
4% and 9%. Only one had a sampling fraction below 2%—the largest county,
Hennepin. The overall sampling fraction was 4.9% of precincts.
Reported undervotes, overvotes and votes for all other candidates total
less than the vote reported for runner-up Mark Kennedy, so they can all be
pooled into one pseudo-candidate as described in section 3.1. Thus, we have
K = 3 pseudo-candidates, f = 1, N = 4,123, B = 2,217,818, M = 443,196.
We will consider two upper bounds on the precinct-level miscount, u= e+(b)
20Mean 471, median 272, IQR 505.
21Spring Lake Park Precinct 3 and Orono Precinct 2.
22However, discrepancies caused by machine-unreadable ballots do not trigger an esca-
lation of the audit.
23Lee Township, Norman County.
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Table 5
The smallest number of precincts in Minnesota as a whole that must have
wp(ep)>
∨
J
w(e) for the outcome of the election to differ from the outcome a full
manual recount would show, where J is the set of indices of precincts actually sampled.
Here
∨
J
w(e) is the observed value of the test statistic for the 202 precincts in the
sample. Values are given for three choices of the weight functions wp and two bounds u
on the amount of error each precinct can hold
wp(z) = z wp(z) = z/bp wp(z) = (z − 2)+/bp
u= e+(b) 130 128 130
u= 0.4b 721 720 721
and u= 0.4b, and three functions for weighting the precinct-level potential
margin overstatements, wp(z) = z, wp(z) = z/bp and wp(z) = (z − 2)+/bp.
The approach to dealing with stratification in Section 4.2.2 leads to very
large P -values in this example—over 27% for all six combinations of u and
wp. We can get a very conservative P -value by pretending that the sample
was drawn with replacement from the entire population of precincts, but
that only 1.9% of the precincts (78) were sampled; this is an application of
the bound in Section 4.2.1. Table 5 shows the lower bounds on the number of
precincts statewide that would have to have potential margin overstatements
greater than w−1p (
∨
J w(e)) in order to have E ≥M (here J are the indices
of the 202 precincts in the actual sample).
Table 6 gives the corresponding P -values. It also gives P -values using the
same observed discrepancies, but pretending that the sample of 202 precincts
was drawn in two other ways: as a stratified sample with sample size propor-
tional to the number of precincts in each county, using the bound derived
in Section 4.2.1, or as a simple random sample of 202 precincts. Had the
202 precincts been drawn in either of those ways, the P -values would be
much smaller than the bound derived for the sampling scheme Minnesota
actually used.
Table 6 shows that the audit data would allow us to reject the hypothesis
that a full recount would find a different winner at significance level 10%, for
all three choices of test statistics and for either error bound. Stark (2008b)
finds P -values about half as large using a sharper measure of discrepancy.
For the error bound u= 0.4b, we could reject the hypothesis at significance
level 1%. If the data had come from a simple random sample from the state
as a whole, or if the sample size in each county had been proportional to
the number of precincts in the county, we would have been able to reject
the hypothesis that the apparent outcome differs from the outcome a full
manual recount would show at significance level 1%.
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Table 6
P -values for the hypothesis that a full manual recount would show that Amy Klobuchar
did not win the Senate race, under different assumptions about how the sample was
drawn and the potential margin overstatement in each precinct [upper bounds u= e+(b)
and u= 0.4b], and different choices of the weighting of errors in each precinct. The first
row is for precinct-level weight function wp(z) = z: each error has the same weight. The
second row is for wp(z) = z/bp: errors in larger precincts have lower weight. The third
row is for wp(z) = (z − 2)+/bp: that test statistic ignores the first two potential margin
overstatements in each precinct; after the first two, potential margin overstatements in
larger precincts have lower weight. Columns 2 and 3 are very conservative upper bounds
derived by treating the sample as if it were a smaller sample of 1.9% of the precincts in
each county (78 precincts in all, rather than 202). Columns 4 and 5 pretend that the data
came from a stratified random sample of 202 precincts in which the number of precincts
drawn from each county is proportional to the number of precincts in the county.
Columns 6 and 7 pretend that the data came from a simple random sample from all the
precincts in the state. Only the results in columns 2 and 3 apply to the auditing scheme
Minnesota actually used
1.9% sample w/ Sample w/o
replacement Proportional sample replacement
u = e+(b)u = 0.4bu = e+(b) u = 0.4b u = e+(b) u = 0.4b
wp(z) = z 8.2% 0.00003% 0.15% 1.4× 10
−15% 0.13% 4.6× 10−16%
wp(z) = z/bp 8.5% 0.00003% 0.17% 1.5× 10
−13% 0.15% 4.9× 10−16%
wp(z) = (z − 2)+/bp 8.2% 0.00003% 0.15% 1.4× 10
−15% 0.13% 4.6× 10−16%
6. Discussion.
6.1. P -values. As illustrated in Section 5, the method can also find the
maximum P -value of the hypothesis that E ≥M and hence of the hypothesis
that the election outcome is incorrect given discrepancy data from a par-
ticular sampling design. The maximum P -value is pi⋆(
∨
J1 w(e);n1, u,w,M),
where J1 is the initial random sample, of size n1. This expression applies
only to the initial sample. If the approach is used sequentially, the P -values
need to be adjusted to take that into account.
6.2. Two-position contests requiring super-majority. The bound e+ on
potential margin overstatement can be sharpened easily for contests such
as ballot measures or propositions that have only two positions and that
require more than a simple majority to pass. For example, suppose that a
contest allows only “yes” or “no” votes, and requires a 2/3 majority of “yes”
votes to pass. Suppose that, according to the reported totals, the measure
passed. Let “yes” be candidate k = 1 and “no” be candidate k = 2. The
effective apparent margin is the margin above 2/3 of the total vote:
M = ⌊V1 −
2
3(V1 + V2)⌋.(28)
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An error that increases V1 by one vote increases V1−
2
3 (V1+V2) by only 1/3
of a vote. An error that decreases V2 by one vote increases V1 −
2
3 (V1 + V2)
by 2/3 of a vote. Within each precinct, error could have inflated the effective
apparent margin over 2/3 by no more than
⌈(v1p −
2
3(v1p + v2p)) +
2
3rp⌉= ⌈
2
3(rp + v1p/2− v2p)⌉.(29)
These are smaller upper bounds u for e than e+ are, but still rigorous.
6.3. Why not use the sample sum or sample mean? Using the discrep-
ancy of the totals across the precincts in the sample as the test statistic
instead of calculating the discrepancy separately for each precinct would
have advantages. For example, it would allow errors that hurt a particular
candidate to cancel errors favoring that candidate in a different precinct,
which might allow us to reject the hypothesis that the wrong candidate was
named the winner using smaller samples. However, it is far more difficult to
calculate tail probabilities for the discrepancy of the totals. In particular, it
is not true that the most difficult-to-detect election-altering taint concen-
trates as much miscount as possible in as few precincts as possible, precisely
because cancellations can occur.
6.4. Improving the power. The approach presented here is conservative:
the chance that it declares the outcome to be correct when the outcome
is not correct is at most α. However, other approaches could do the same
thing using smaller audit samples—they could have more power for the same
significance level.
The elements of the approach with the most room for improvement are
these:
1. The test statistic, pooling and aggregation of the miscount. There are
sharper necessary conditions and measures of discrepancy; see, for exam-
ple, Stark (2008b). The functions {wp}p∈N could be optimized against
various alternatives. One could construct a more powerful test using likeli-
hood ratios or the sample sum, as described in Section 6.3. However, these
improvements in power come at a cost of far more complex probability
calculations and a loss of transparency to jurisdictional users. Numerical
optimization would appear to be necessary to calculate P -values.
2. Stratification. The approaches to dealing with stratification for contests
that cross county lines are conservative but not sharp. Better inequalities
would allow smaller samples to be used.
3. Thresholds for sequential tests. The inequalities used to set the signifi-
cance levels in the sequential tests could be improved.
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4. Sample design. If we were at liberty to choose the sampling design, a
different approach—such as sampling with probability proportional to up,
the upper bound on the potential margin overstatement—might permit
smaller samples.24
Ideas from sequential analysis [Siegmund (1985) and Wald (2004)] could
certainly help improve the thresholds for sequential testing.
6.5. Alternative approaches. One could also take a Bayesian approach
to the problem: given a prior probability distribution, one could compute
posterior odds that the election named the right winner given the audit data,
and confirm the outcome if those odds were, say, 100 to 1 or greater. This
approach requires prior probability distributions for the number of votes for
each candidate and for the potential margin overstatement.
The false discovery rate [Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)] gives another
perspective: rather than insist that the chance of confirming an outcome
that is incorrect be no larger than α, we could require the expected fraction
of confirmed election outcomes that are confirmed in error to be no larger
than α.
A rather different approach is to combine a base rate of random sampling
with “targeted” sampling, where candidates or other interested parties select
some precincts for audit by any means they choose [Norden et al. (2007)
and Jefferson et al. (2007)]. Computing a P -value for this approach would
require an ad hoc model for the efficacy of “educated guesses” in finding
miscounted precincts, but the method could increase public confidence in
the election outcome.
Any of these approaches is incomplete without rules for expanding the
audit if the precincts in the targeted sample show material miscount, cul-
minating either in confirming the outcome or in a full recount.
7. Conclusions. Post-election audits can be used to confirm election out-
comes or show that a full manual recount is needed. The election outcome
is confirmed if, on the assumption that the election outcome is incorrect,
the probability is large that the sample would have contained larger poten-
tial margin overstatements than it did contain. If that probability is not
sufficiently large, the sample size needs to be increased. Eventually, either
24See, for example, Aslam, Popa and Rivest (2007) and Stark (2008a). Current and
pending audit laws do not contemplate sampling designs other than simple or stratified
random samples. If sampling with probability proportional to up were allowed, it would
bring election auditing much closer to work in financial auditing, where monetary unit
sampling is often used [Panel on Nonstandard Mixtures of Distributions (1989)]. However,
if precincts have differing probabilities of selection, so do ballots, which might raise legal
issues of differential enfranchisement.
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the sample includes every precinct (there has been a complete manual re-
count), or there is compelling statistical evidence that the election outcome
is correct.
Confirming an election outcome statistically requires upper bounds on the
potential margin overstatement in each precinct. Such upper bounds can be
calculated from upper bounds on the total number of votes in each precinct.
Upper bounds on the number of votes could in turn come from the number
of registered voters, from the number of ballots issued to precincts, from
precinct pollbooks or from “ballot accounting.” Alternatively, one might
use ad hoc bounds on the potential margin overstatement, such as 40% of
the number of reported ballots in the precinct. The results are sensitive to
the bounds, so ad hoc choices need to be justified and tested empirically in
every election.
Combining a base rate of sampling (such as California’s 1% law) with
rules for increasing the sample size for contests, where—given the margin,
the number of ballots cast in each precinct and the miscount observed in
the initial sample—the outcome is in doubt, is a statistically sound and
potentially practical way25 to use post-election audits to decide whether to
confirm the outcome. The base rate of sampling provides a broad check for
gross errors; increasing the sample size for close contests and contests where
the audit reveals potential margin overstatements can guarantee any desired
level of confidence in the outcome.
In states where election regulations do not contemplate increasing the
size of an initial audit, the approach outlined here can be used to calculate
the confidence that each election outcome is correct,26 given the size of the
sample, the margin, the reported votes in each precincts and the potential
margin overstatements observed in the sample.
APPENDIX
A.1. Proof of Claim 1. Both Px{
∨
J ⋆n
w(x) ≤ t} and Px{
∨
J ⋄n
w(x) ≤ t}
are monotonic in #{p :xp ≤ w
−1
p (t)}. Hence, pi⋆(t) and pi⋄(t) are attained
by the element x− of X with the fewest components greater than the cor-
responding components of w−1(t). To maximize #{p :xp ≤ w
−1
p (t)} while
keeping E =
∑
N x≥M and x≤ u, set xp = up for those components p for
25The method was tested in practice in Marin County, California, to audit Measure A
on the 5 February 2008 ballot to attain 75% confidence that a full manual count would
match the apparent outcome.
26As mentioned above, “confidence” that the outcome is correct is taken to mean 100%
minus the P -value of the hypothesis that the outcome is incorrect; this is not a standard
statistical definition of “confidence.”
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which up − w
−1
p (t) is largest, and set the remaining components of x to
whichever is smaller, up or w
−1
p (t). Thus, for some k, x
− is of the form
x−p =
{
(u∧w−1(t))p, p ∈ J
−
k
up, p /∈ J
−
k .
(30)
The value of k that gives x− is the largest possible value for which E ≥M ,
namely, q [defined in equation (17)]. The chance that J ⋆n (w(x
−))≤ t is the
chance that J ⋆n consists of n of the q components of x
− that are less than the
corresponding components of w−1(t), as equation (18) asserts. Similarly, the
chance that J ⋄n (w(x
−))≤ t is the chance that J ⋄n includes only components
x− that are less than the corresponding components of w−1(t). There are q
such components, so the chance is (q/N)n, as claimed.
A.2. Proof of Claim 2. Among the N precincts in the contest, k have
wp(ep) ≤ t. We divide the N precincts into C strata. In stratum c, there
are Nc precincts of which kc precincts have wp(ep)≤ t, and
∑
c∈C kc = k. We
draw ncs = ⌈nsNc/N⌉ precincts at random without replacement from county
c. Let n′s =
∑
c∈C ncs ≥ ns. Let Sc be the number of precincts in the sample
from county c for which wp(ep)> t. Then Sc has the hypergeometric distri-
bution with parameters Nc, Nc − kc and ncs, and {Sc}c∈C are independent.
Moreover,
P{Sc = 0}=
( kc
ncs
)
(Nc
ncs
) ≤ (kc/Nc)ncs .(31)
This follows from the fact that xy >
x−1
y−1 when x < y and y > 1. Because the
samples from different strata are independent,
P
{∑
c∈C
Sc = 0
}
≤
∏
c∈C
(kc/Nc)
ncs .(32)
Since ncs ≥ nsNc/N , and ns =
∑
c∈C nsNc/N ,∏
c∈C
(kc/Nc)
ncs ≤
∏
c∈C
(kc/Nc)
nsNc/N
≤
(
1
ns
∑
c∈C
(nsNc/N)(kc/Nc)
)ns
(33)
= (k/N)ns .
The second step is an application of the arithmetic mean–geometric mean
inequality. Hoeffding (1956), Theorem 4, proves something rather more gen-
eral.
32 P. B. STARK
Inequality (33) shows that if we draw a stratified sample of precincts with
ncs precincts from county c, c ∈ C, but compute the maximum P -value as if
we were sampling with replacement from the entire population ofN precincts
(i.e., if we use pi⋄ as the bound on the P -value), we get a conservative test.
A.3. Proof of Claim 3. Claim 3 just asserts that either every element of
a list is equal to the mean of the list, or there is at least one element greater
than the mean:
E
B
=
∑
c∈C Ec
B
=
∑
c∈C Bc(Ec/Bc)
B
=
∑
c∈C
Bc/B(Ec/Bc)
(34)
≤
(∑
c∈C
Bc/B
)
×
∨
c∈C
|Ec|
Bc
=B/B ×
∨
c∈C
|Ec|
Bc
=
∨
c∈C
|Ec|
Bc
.
The antepenultimate step follows from Ho¨lder’s inequality.
So, if the total potential margin overstatement E across counties is M or
more, there must be at least one county c for which Ec ≥MBc/B.
Acknowledgments. I am grateful to Vittorio Addono, Kim Alexander,
Alessandra Baniel-Stark, Kathy Dopp, Stephen Fienberg, David Freedman,
Joe Hall, Mark Halvorson, David Jefferson, Mark Lindeman, John Mc-
Carthy, Jasjeet Sekhon, Howard Stanislevic, David Wagner and an anony-
mous referee for helpful conversations and comments on an earlier draft, and
to Elaine Ginnold and Melvin Briones for data.
REFERENCES
Aslam, J. A., Popa, R. A. and Rivest, R. L. (2007). On auditing elec-
tions when precincts have different sizes. Available at people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/
AslamPopaRivest-OnAuditingElectionsWhenPrecinctsHaveDifferentSizes.pdf.
Benjamini, Y. and Hochberg, Y. (1995). Controlling the false discovery rate: A practical
and powerful approach to multiple testing. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 57 289–300.
MR1325392
Bjornlund, E. C. (2004). Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building
Democracy. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC.
CONSERVATIVE ELECTION AUDITS 33
Dopp, K. and Stenger, F. (2006). The election integrity audit. Available at
uscountvotes.org/ucvInfo/release/ElectionIntegrityAudit-release.pdf.
Elections: Federal efforts to improve security and reliability of electronic
voting systems are under way, but key activities need to be completed
(2005). Technical Report GAO-05-956, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Wash-
ington, DC.
Elections: The nation’s evolving election system as reflected in the Novem-
ber 2004 general election (2006). Technical Report GAO-06-450, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Washington, DC.
Estok, M., Nevitte, N. and Cowan, G. (2002). The Quick Count and Election Obser-
vation. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington, DC.
Halvorson, M. and Wolff, L. (2007). Report and analysis of the
2006 post-election audit of Minnesotas voting systems. Available at
ceimn.org/files/CEIMNAuditReport2006.pdf.
Hite, R. C. (2007). Elections: All levels of government are needed to address electronic
voting system challenges. Technical Report GAO-07-714T, U.S. Government Account-
ability Office, Washington, DC.
Hoeffding, W. (1956). On the distribution of the number of successes in independent
trials. Ann. Math. Statist. 27 713–721. MR0080391
Jefferson, D., Alexander, K., Ginnold, E., Lehmkuhl, A., Midstokke, K. and
Stark, P. B. (2007). Post election audit standards report–evaluation of audit sam-
pling models and options for strengthening Californias manual count. Available at
www.sos.ca.gov/elections/peas/final peaswg report.pdf.
McCarthy, J., Stanislevic, H., Lindeman, M., Ash, A., Addona, V. and Batcher,
M. (2008). Percentage based vs. statistical-power-based vote tabulation auditing. The
American Statistician 62 11–16.
Norden, L., Burstein, A., Hall, J. L. and Chen, M. (2007). Post-election audits:
Restoring trust in elections. Technical report, Brennan Center for Justice, New York
University and Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic at University of
California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), New York.
National Association of Secretaries of State (2007).
Post election audit procedures by state. Available at
nass.org/index.php?option=com docman&task=doc download&gid=54.
Panel on Nonstandard Mixtures of Distributions (1989). Statistical models and
analysis in auditing: Panel on nonstandard mixtures of distributions. Statist. Sci. 4
2–33.
Rivest, R. L. (2006). On estimating the size of a statistical audit. Available at
people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-OnEstimatingTheSizeOfAStatisticalAudit.pdf.
Saltman, R. G. (1975). Effective use of computing technology in vote-tallying. Technical
Report NBSIR 75-687, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, DC.
Siegmund, D. (1985). Sequential Analysis: Tests and Confidence Intervals. Springer, New
York. MR0799155
Stanislevic, H. (2006). Random auditing of e-voting systems: How much is enough?
Available at www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/VTTF/EVEPAuditing.pdf.
Stark, P. B. (2008a). Election audits by sampling with probability pro-
portional to an error bound: Dealing with discrepancies. Available at
statistics.berkeley.edu/˜stark/Preprints/ppebwrwd08.pdf.
Stark, P. B. (2008b). A sharper discrepancy measure for post-election audits. Ann. Appl.
Statist. To appear.
34 P. B. STARK
Verified Voting Foundation (2007). Manual audit requirements. Available at
www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/stateaudits1007.pdf.
Wald, A. (2004). Sequential Analysis. Dover, Mineola, NY.
Department of Statistics
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720-3860
USA
E-mail: stark@stat.berkeley.edu
